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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH

:

Plaintiff/Appellee

:

v.

:

JEFFREY RAY TOMPKINS

:

Defendant/Appellant

Case No. 20010887-CA
Priority No. 2

:

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from judgments of conviction for first degree operation of a
clandestine drug laboratory, in violation of Utah Code Annotated section 58-37d-5(l)
(1998), and second degree operation of a clandestine drug laboratory, in violation of
Utah Code Annotated section 58-37d-4(l) (1998). This Court has jurisdiction over the
appeal from case number 011903328 under Utah Code Annotated section 78-2a-3(2)(j)
(1996), which authorizes this Court to review appeals that the Utah Supreme Court
transfers to this Court. This Court also has jurisdiction over the appeal from case number
001920749 under Utah Code Annotated section 78-2-2(3)(i) (1996), which grants this
Court jurisdiction over cases not involving a first degree or capital felony. On January
16,2002, this Court consolidated the two appeals.1
!

The appellate record in case number 011903328 is numbered 20010887-CA. The
appellate record in case number 001920749 is marked 20010887-SC. To distinguish
between the two records, this brief will refer to them respectively as ffRCA.,f and "RSC."

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES, STANDARD OF REVIEW AND
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENTS
The trial court abuses its sentencing discretion if it fails to consider all relevant
sentencing factors. In imposing prison sentences and denying probation below, the
sentencing judge failed to consider Appellant's strong family support, acceptance of
responsibility, admission to an inpatient treatment program, and high potential for
rehabilitation. Did the sentencing judge abuse his discretion in denying Appellant
probation and drug treatment?
This Court reviews sentencing decisions for an abuse of discretion. State v.
Montova, 929 P.2d 356, 358 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). Appellant contended at sentencing
that he was suited for probation and drug treatment. R. 57: 3-5, 8-10.

RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Code Annotated section 76-3-201(2) (1999) provides sentencing judges
several options in imposing sentences:
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may
sentence a person convicted of an offense to any one of the
following sentences or combination of them:
(a) to pay a fine;

The internal page numbers of those records are listed after the volume designations.
Because Appellant pleaded guilty and was sentenced in the same hearings in both
cases, this brief refers only to volume 56 for the guilty plea hearing and volume 57 for the
sentencing hearing. The transcripts of those hearings are referred to as "R." followed by
the volume number.
2

(b) to removal or disqualification from public or private office;
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law;
(d) to imprisonment;
(e) life imprisonment
(f) on or after April 27,1992, to life in prison without parole; or
(g) to death.2
Utah Code Annotated section 77-18-l(2)(a) (1999) grants sentencing judges
discretion whether to impose probation:
On a plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, no contest, or
conviction of any crime or offense, the court may suspend the
imposition or execution of sentence and place the defendant on
probation. The court may place the defendant:
(i) on probation under the supervision of the Department of Corrections
except in cases of class C misdemeanors or infractions;
(ii) on probation with an agency of local government or with a private
organization; or
(iii) on bench probation under the jurisdiction of the sentencing court.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On December 12, 2000, in case number 001920749, the State charged Appellant
Jeffrey Ray Tompkins with operating a clandestine methamphetamine lab and unlawful
possession of a controlled substance. RSC. 2. On March 8, 2001, in case number
011903328, the State charged Mr. Tompkins in a separate Information with possession
of clandestine laboratory precursors and equipment, unlawful distribution of a controlled

2

The legislature amended section 76-3-201(2) in 2001 and combined subsections
(d) and (e) to simply provide that judges can impose imprisonment. Utah Code Ann. §
76-3-201(2) (Supp. 2001).
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substance, and possession of drug paraphernalia. RCA. 2. Mr. Tompkins entered an
agreement to plead guilty to one count of first degree operating a clandestine lab in case
number 001920749 and one count of second degree operating a clandestine lab in case
number 011903328. RSC. 30. In exchange, the State agreed to drop the remaining
charges and to recommend concurrent sentences to the sentencing judge. R. 30.
The trial court accepted Mr. Tompkins' guilty pleas on July 2, 2001, and ordered
the Department of Adult Probation and Parole ("APP") to prepare a presentence
investigation report ("PSR").3 R. 56: 8-10. APP recommended sentencing Mr.
Tompkins to one year in jail followed by inpatient drug treatment at Odyssey House.
PSR: 14. The trial court sentenced Mr. Tompkins on September 24, 2001. R. 57. The
sentencing judge rejected the investigator's recommendation and sentenced Mr.
Tompkins to concurrent terms of five years to life and one to 15 years in the state prison.
R. 57: 11; RCA. 40; RSC. 46; Addenda A, B..
On October 24, 2001, Mr. Tompkins appealed his conviction in case number
001920749 to the Utah Supreme Court and separately appealed his conviction in case
number 011903328 to this Court. RCA. 43; RSC. 48. On December 19, 2001, the Utah
Supreme Court transferred the appeal from case number 001920749 to this Court. This
Court then consolidated the two appeals on January 16, 2002.
3

Appellate counsel has requested the clerk of the district court to supplement the
record with the PSR. As of this date, the clerk has not done so. Appellate counsel will
ensure that the clerk supplements the record.
4

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Mr. Tompkins was bom in Oceanside, California on October 27, 1971. PSR: 8.
He grew up in a supportive, two-parent, middle class family. PSR: 8. Following his
graduation from high school, Mr. Tompkins left his parents' home to seek more
independence. PSR: 8-9. He later married and divorced. PSR: 8.
In 1990 at the age of 19, Mr. Tompkins began drinking alcohol. PSR: 10. By age
21, Mr. Tompkins started smoking marijuana and consuming several cans of beer a day.
PSR: 10. In 1992, Mr. Tompkins was convicted for DUI and he completed counseling.
PSR: 10. At the age of 22, Mr. Tompkins first used methamphetamine and became
addicted to it. PSR: 10.
In 1996, Mr. Tompkins moved to Utah in an effort to remedy his drug problem.
PSR: 8. Mr. Tompkins maintained steady employment throughout his drug and alcohol
struggles. PSR: 11. But, in 1999, Mr. Tompkins lost his job due to several arrest
warrants for traffic violations. PSR: 4. About this time, some of Mr. Tompkins'
methamphetamine suppliers discussed with him the possibility of using his residence in
Draper for a clandestine methamphetamine laboratory. PSR: 4. Mr. Tompkins agreed
for a fee to leave the house while the suppliers produced the drugs and to clean up after
the suppliers completed the manufacturing process. PSR: 4. Eventually, one of the
suppliers moved into the residence with Mr. Tompkins. PSR: 4.
On September 23, 1999, police officers from several agencies served a search
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warrant on Mr. Tompkins' residence. PSR: 2. The police found Mr. Tompkins in the
basement along with a clandestine lab and lab equipment. PSR: 2. The State charged
Mr. Tompkins with operating a clandestine methamphetamine lab and unlawful
possession of a controlled substance. RSC. 2.
After being released from jail, Mr. Tompkins' dependency on methamphetamine
increased. PSR: 4. He spent most of his paycheck on dmgs and he needed more drugs to
maintain his habit. PSR: 4. To solve this problem, Mr. Tompkins decided to
manufacture methamphetamine himself. PSR: 4.
On February 1, 2001, the police served a search warrant on Mr. Tompkins' new
residence in West Jordan where he lived with two other people. PSR: 3. The police
found Mr. Tompkins in the home holding PH strips, which apparently are used in the
production of methamphetamine. PSR: 3. The police also located a working clandestine
laboratory in the basement along with several grams of methamphetamine. PSR: 3. The
house contained numerous items associated with the production, use, and distribution of
methamphetamine including a recipe, baggies, scales, and paraphernalia. PSR: 3.
Mr. Tompkins admitted to police that he had been manufacturing
methamphetamine just prior to their arrival. PSR: 3. He claimed that the lab belonged to
someone else but that he had stolen some chemicals to produce his own drugs. PSR: 3.
He stated that he made the drugs for his own personal use and to sell to others. PSR: 3.
The State charged Mr. Tompkins with possession of clandestine laboratory precursors
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and equipment, unlawful distribution of a controlled substance, and possession of drug
paraphernalia. RCA. 2.
Mr. Tompkins entered an agreement with the State to plead guilty to one count of
second degree operation of a clandestine lab for his arrest in Draper and to a first degree
operation charge for his arrest in West Jordan. RSC. 30. The trial court accepted Mr.
Tompkins' guilty pleas and ordered APP to prepare a presentence report. R. 56: 8-10.
In the report, Mr. Tompkins freely admitted his drug problem and he accepted
responsibility for his actions. PSR: 4, 13. He recited the circumstances that led to his
involvement with the methamphetamines and he explained that when he was arrested for
the second lab he was using it for the first time. PSR: 4. Contrary to his statement to the
police, he claimed that he set up the lab for his own personal use only, not to sell or trade
drugs. PSR: 4.
Mr. Tompkins expressed an earnest desire to participate in a drug treatment
program. PSR: 9-13; RCA. 24. He has never received probation or drug treatment.
PSR: 8, 10. To illustrate his commitment to addressing his drug problem, he attended
Alcoholics Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous classes while in jail. PSR: 10. And,
through the help of his parents, he was accepted into an inpatient drug treatment program
at Odyssey House. PSR: 10. Although he reported no history of psychological
disorders, he was also willing to enter therapy if it would help him to quit his drug habit.
PSR: 10.
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Mr. Tompkins expressed his sincerity to succeed both in a letter to the sentencing
judge and verbally to the APP investigator. RCA. 24; PSR: 13. He recognized that his
crimes were "serious" and he took foil responsibility for Ihem. PSR: 13. He realized that
drugs and alcohol had caused him to lose his family's and friends' respect. RCA. 24;
PSR: 13. If he could change the past, Mr. Tompkins would do so and avoid his mistakes.
PSR: 13. He pleaded for an opportunity for probation and drug treatment because his
"life depended] on this." RCA. 24; PSR: 13. His time in jail had taught him the
importance of overcoming his drug habit and he was committed to succeeding. RCA.
24; PSR: 13. After completing drug treatment, Mr. Tompkins planned to further his
education in computers. PSR: 9.
APP administered a Level of Service Inventory ("LSI") to Mr. Tompkins to gauge
his likelihood of successfully overcoming his addiction. PSR: 12. Mr. Tompkins scored
13 on the test. PSR: 12. Based on this performance, APP concluded that Mr. Tompkins
posed "a low likelihood of recidivism, with a need for intensive supervision." PSR: 12.
The APP investigator concluded that Mr. Tompkins was "an intelligent individual
who has potential to become a productive citizen in the community" if he were granted
probation and took it seriously. PSR: 13. She recommended that Mr. Tompkins serve
one year in jail with credit for time served and then be placed on probation and enter
Odyssey House's inpatient treatment program. PSR: 14.
At sentencing, defense counsel argued that Mr. Tompkins presented a compelling
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case for probation. He noted that it was very unusual for APP to recommend probation
in cases involving clandestine labs. R. 57: 3. Mr. Tompkins' LSI score of 13 and risk of
recidivism were the lowest that defense counsel could remember of any of his clients. R.
57: 3. Given Mr. Tompkins' family support, good attitude, and prospects for success,
defense counsel asserted that in his experience Mr. Tompkins was one of the few people
who he could say with confidence would succeed at drug treatment and probation. R.
57: 4-5.
Mr. Tompkins again expressed his understanding of the seriousness of his crimes.
R. 57: 8-9. He stated that he was prepared to enter treatment and he was committed to
succeeding. R. 57: 9. He asked for a chance at probation and promised that he would
not appear before the sentencing judge again. R. 57: 9.
The prosecutor argued that Mr. Tompkins' crimes, including the evidence that Mr.
Tompkins had sold drugs, warranted a prison sentence given their seriousness. R. 57: 56. She dismissed APP's recommendation as a budgetary measure designed to save
prison space for violent offenders. R. 57: 5-6. She claimed that Mr. Tompkins was
likely to re-offend given her belief that Mr. Tompkins had been selling drugs. R. 57: 6-7.
Defense counsel countered that Mr. Tompkins would likely only re-offend if he does not
receive treatment for his addiction. R. 57: 9-10.
The sentencing judge stated that he was surprised by APP's recommendation after
reading the presentence report. R. 57: 10. If sentencing just involved Mr. Tompkins, the
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judge was inclined to grant probation. R. 57: 11. But, given "the number of meth labs"
and the "unaccountable damage that they do in our community," the sentencing judge felt
compelled to impose a prison term. R. 57: 10-11. Accordingly, the judge sentenced Mr.
Tompkins to concurrent terms of five years to life and one to 15 years. R. 57: 11. These
consolidated appeals followed.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Instead of factoring Mr. Tompkins' indisputably favorable prospects for probation
and rehabilitation, the sentencing judge solely focused on the seriousness of the crimes.
Mr. Tompkins is an ideal candidate for probation given his acceptance of responsibility,
initiative in seeking out a treatment program, strong family support, and understanding of
the seriousness of his drug addiction. He has a strong support system and a solid history
of employment and education to ensure his success. Although clandestine drug
operations pose serious societal problems, an equally important weapon in the arsenal on
drugs is treating those who are most likely to be recover. The sentencing judge abused
his discretion in relying solely on the seriousness of the crimes and in onverlooking Mr.
Tompkins' potential for rehabilitation.

10

ARGUMENT
THE SENTENCING JUDGE ABUSED HIS DISCRETION
IN IMPOSING A PRISON SENTENCE INSTEAD OF
ORDERING A JAIL TERM, DRUG TREATMENT, AND
PROBATION GIVEN APPELLANT'S FAVORABLE
ATTITUDE AND LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCEEDING
In sentencing Mr. Tompkins to prison, the sentencing judge cast aside a person
who likely could be rehabilitated. Almost all indications point to Mr. Tompkins
successfully completing drug treatment and probation. Instead of considering the
potential for rehabilitation, the sentencing judge denied Mr. Tompkins the opportunity to
confront his drug problem simply because this case involved a clandestine
methamphetamine lab. Because the sentencing judge failed to adequately weigh the
relevant sentencing factors, he abused his discretion in denying Mr. Tompkins needed
help.
Sentencing judges have wide discretion in deciding whether to order probation in
lieu of a prison term. State v. Chapoose. 985 P.2d 915, 917 (Utah 1999). Judges may
"impose sentence or a combination of sentences which may include the payment of a fine,
restitution, probation, or imprisonment.,, State v. Snvder. 747 P.2d 417, 420 (Utah 1987);
see also; Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(2) (1999). "An appellate court will set aside a
sentence imposed by the trial court if the sentence represents an abuse of discretion, State
v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978), if the trial judge fails to consider all legally
relevant factors, State v. Holland, 777 P.2d 1019 (Utah 1989), or if the sentence imposed
11

exceeds the limits prescribed by law." State v. Gibbons, 779 P.2d 1133, 1135 (Utah
1989).
But, in exercising their sentencing discretion, judges must consider several factors.
These factors include the "'character, personality and attitude"1 of the defendant. State v.
Rhodes. 818 P.2d 1048, 1049 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (quoting State v. Sibert 310 P.2d
388, 393 (Utah 1957)). Judges must also weigh the seriousness of the crime, the
defendant's prior record, and the likelihood of rehabilitation. I d at 1049, 1051. In
weighing the option of probation, sentencing judges must consider whether probation
"will best serve the ends of justice and is compatible with the public interest." Id. at
1051.
Here, the trial judge abused his discretion in failing to adequately weigh the
compelling reasons supporting probation and drug treatment. State v. McCovey, 803
P.2d 1234, 1235 (Utah 1990); Gibbons. 779 P.2d at 1135. First, Mr. Tompkins poses an
extremely low risk of re-offending. In fact, his LSI score was so low that defense counsel
could not remember a client presenting such a minimal risk.
Second, Mr. Tompkins is an ideal candidate for drug treatment. He has repeatedly
asked for treatment and expressed his commitment to succeed. Mr. Tompkins exhibited
such good character and potential for rehabilitation that APP recommended probation and
drug treatment even though APP rarely does so in clandestine lab cases. His intelligence,
family support, positive attitude, and acceptance of responsibility highly impressed the
12

APP investigator. Mr. Tompkins proved his initiative and motivation to improve himself
by enrolling in Alcoholics and Narcotics Anonymous classes while awaiting sentencing
in jail. With the assistance of his family, he sought out a respected inpatient treatment
program and obtained acceptance to it. Even though Mr. Tompkins has experienced no
psychological difficulties, he expressed a willingness to participate in therapy to assist
him to overcome his drug addiction. Finally, he plans to further his education and to seek
a career in computers.
Third, Mr. Tompkins has also repeatedly expressed remorse and an understanding
of the seriousness of his crimes. His experience in jail has shown him the stark reality of
prison life, including the loss of his family and friends. He likewise appreciate: that his
addiction is a matter of life or death.
Fourth, a review of Mr. Tompkins' past demonstrates that he has a solid support
system and foundation upon which to draw. He has a supportive, loving family who has
helped arrange for a treatment program. His prior criminal record consists of only one
DUI and a few traffic violations. He graduated from high school and, despite his drug
problems, he has maintained steady employment throughout his adult years. He even
secured a new job shortly after his first arrest. PSR: 11.
The only factors supporting prison sentences are the seriousness of the crimes and
Mr. Tompkins' apparent retraction about selling and trading drugs. Admittedly, operating
a clandestine methamphetamine lab is a grave crime. Methamphetamine is highly
13

dangerous and addictive. Nevertheless, the seriousness of the crime of operating a
clandestine drug lab does not by itself demand a prison sentence. The legislature has
specified only a few especially serious crimes for which probation is not available. Utah
Code Ann. § 76-3-406 (1999). Operating a clandestine lab is not one of them.
The sentencing judge rejected the availability of probation and based his
sentencing decision entirely on "the number of meth labs" and "the unaccountable
damage that they do in our community." R. 57: 10-11. Although these characterizations
are undisputably true, the sentencing judge failed to even acknowledge the extensive
evidence showing that Mr. Tompkins was an excellent candidate for probation and drug
treatment. It appears that under the sentencing judge's view, no one similarly situated to
Mr. Tompkins could receive probation.
This analysis does not minimize the pervasive problem that methamphetamine
poses. Indeed, Mr. Tompkins' addiction may have led him to sell drugs in addition to
producing them himself. Nevertheless, the sentencing judge's complete reliance on
society's concern for stemming drugs overshadowed equally strong societal interests. As
defense counsel raised at sentencing, drugs will only be eliminated from our society if
individuals stop using them. Rather than considering whether rehabilitating Mr.
Tompkins was "compatible with the public interest" by helping to actually solve the drug
problem, the sentencing judge appears to have made the blanket determination that
methamphetamine production was simply too serious to allow for probation. Rhodes, 818
14

P.2d at 1051. In the process, the sentencing judge failed to make an individualized
determination, ignored Mr. Tompkins' excellent prospects, and left him to the whim of
the prison system and whatever classes it might offer on addiction.
The APP investigator was in a much better position to assess Mr. Tompkins'
character and potential for rehabilitation than the sentencing judge. This is particularly
true here where the only contact the sentencing judge had with Mr. Tompkins was at the
plea change hearing and at sentencing. In contrast, the investigator personally
interviewed Mr. Tompkins, administered the LSI test, and had a meaningful opportunity
to assess his demeanor and character. Given law enforcement's commonly-expressed
concerns about methamphetamine, the APP investigator's judgment to impose probation
seems to be a far superior assessment than a judge's decision when that judge has had
little or no contact with the defendant. Instead, the trial judge relied solely on the
seriousness of the crimes.
This case similar to State v. GallL 967 P.2d 930 (Utah 1998), where the Utah
Supreme Court concluded that "'[t]he record clearly reflected that the trial courts failed to
give '"adequate weight to certain mitigating circumstances.'ff State v. Helms. 2002 UT
12,1J15, 439 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (quoting GallL 967 P.2d at 938). Likewise, the
sentencing judge's complete reliance on the seriousness of the crimes and his failure to
even mention the compelling evidence supporting probation "clearly" establishes an
abuse of discretion. Id. The sentencing judge's failure to weigh Mr. Tompkins' good
15

character, strong family support, and potential for rehabilitation require a new sentencing
hearing.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Tompkins requests this Court to remand this matter to the trial court for a new
sentencing hearing with instructions to impose probation and drug treatment.

Submitted, this £tt day of March, 2002.

KENT R. HART
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

DAVID P. S. MACK
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT SALT LAK3 COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.

Case No: 011903328 FS

JEFFERY RAY TOMPKINS,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

PAUL G. MAUGHAN
September 24, 2001

PRESENT
Clerk:
cheril
Prosecutor: COEBERGH, COLLEEN K
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): MACK, DAVID
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: October 27, 1971
Video
Tape Number:
Video
Tape Count: 10:34
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CHARGES
1. OPERATION OF A CLANDESTINE LABORATORY - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 07/05/2001 {Guilty Plea}
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of OPERATION OF A CLANDESTINE
LABORATORY a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an
indeterminate term of not less than one year nor more than fifteen
years in rhe Utah State Prison.
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately.
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
defendant will be confined.

Case No: 011903328
Date:
Sep 24, 2001

SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
This prison commitment is to run concurrent with case #001920749.

ADDENDUM B

THIRD DISTRICT COURT SALT LAKE COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.

Case No: 001920749 FS

JEFFREY RAY TOMPKIN,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

PAUL G. MAUGHAN
September 24, 2001

PRESENT
Clerk:
cheril
Reporter: TRIPP, DOROTHY
Prosecutor: COEBERGH, COLLEEN K
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): MACK, DAVID
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: October 27, 1971
Video
Tape Number:
Video
CHARGES
1. OPERATION OF A CLANDESTINE LABORATORY - 1st Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 07/05/2001 {Guilty Plea}
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of OPERATION OF A CLANDESTINE
LABORATORY a 1st Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an
indeterminate term of not less than five years and which may be
life in the Utah State Prison.
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately.
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
defendant will be confined.

Case No: 001920749
Date:
Sep 24, 2001

SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
This commitment is to run concurrent with case #011903328.

Dated this

day of

, 20

.

PAUL G. MAUGHAN
District Court Judge

